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COMMENTS
NUISANCE-LIABILiTY FOR DEPREDATIONS OF ANIMALS Ferae Yaturae
PURFOSEIY ATTRACTED TO THE LAND
Anderews v. Andrews, 242 N.C. J82, 88 S.E.2d 88 (1955)
Defendant constructed a pond upon his farm near plaintiffs' ad-
joining lands. Later, defendant, knowing the habits of wild geese and
for the purpose of attracting them, placed decoys, food, and bait on
the pond. In the following three-year period the number of geese
attracted to the pond increased from 200 to 3,000. During this time
the geese preyed upon plaintiffs' grain fields, which theretofore had
never been damaged by wild geese, and caused $1,500 damage. After
repeated warnings to defendant, plaintiffs brought an action for
nuisance seeking damages and a restraining order. The lower court
sustained defendant's demurrer on the ground, that he did not own
the geese and was not liable for the intrusions of animals ferae na-
turac which had not been reduced to possession. On appeal the Su-
preme Court of North Carolina reversed, holding that the complaint
stated a cause of action5
An action for private nuisance lies against one who has caused an
unreasonable and substantial interference with the use or enjoyment
of land.' While this interference may be negligent or result from
ultrahazardous conduct,4 most nuisances, as in the principal ease, are
intentional in the sense that the actor creates or continues to maintain
a condition with knowledge that it will result, or is substantially cer-
tain to result, in harm to the interests of another5 Whether an in-
I The dcfendant also demurred on the ground that the complaint did not
allege negligence either in the construction or maintenance of the pond. The
appellate court properly rejected this argument. See note 7 nftr.
2. Andrews v. Andrews,'242 N.C. 382; 88 S.E.2d 88 (1955). On remand, the
case was tried in October 1955. The jury found for the plaintiff and awarded
damages for the crops destroyed by the geese. Letter from .C. MeLeod attorney
for appellant, to the Was h ngtonr University Law Quarterly, Oct 15, 1955.
. ?nossen, Tourts 389-401 (2d ed. 1955). Nuisance may consist of an inter-
fei ce: with the physical condition of the land, or with the comfort and health
"f the oeurnant, or with the occupant's peace of mind. See RESTATMnxT, ToRTs
§ 822 (1939), where the general rule for liability in an action of nuisance isstated as forlows:
The actor is liable in an action for damages for a non-trespassory invasion
of another's interest in the private use and enjoyment of land if,
(a) the other has property rights and privileges in respea to the use
or enjoyment interfered with; and(W the invasion is substantial; and
(c) the actor's conduct is a legal cause of the invasion; and
(d) the invasion is either(i) intentional and unreasonable; or
(ii) unintentional and otherise actionable under the rules govern-
inz liability for negligent, reckless or ultrahazardous conduct.
For a historical background of nuisance, see also RESTATSmSNT Tours, Scope
and Introductory Note to c. 40 at 214-25 (1939); McRae, The Ievelopment of
Nuisance in the Early Common Law, I U. FM LI. REv. 27 (1948).
4. See RsTATEMENT, ToRs § 822, comment nz (1939)P; PossEm, Tors 392-93
(2 d eJ. 1955).
5. REsTATEMnT, TORTS § 825 (1939); PRossr, Tors 392 (2d ed. 1955).
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tentional interference is unreasonable is determined by weighing, in
the light of all the surrounding circumstances, the utility of the ac-
tor's conduct against the resulting harm.6 Nevertheless, while it is
true that the actor's conduct is important in determining the reason-
ableness of the interference, it is important to note that in referring
to the use and enjoyment of land, the action of nuisance refers pri-
marily to the 'interest invaded rather than to the type of conduct caus-
ing the interference.7 The action, therefore, may be maintained only
by those having property rights or privileges in the land.8
The demurrer in the principal case did not attack the complaint on
the ground that any of the basic elements of nuisance outlined above
were missing, but rather on the ground that one is not liable for the
depredations of animals which he does not own., Thus, the issue
presented by the instant case is whether a defendant against whom
an action for nuisance is brought must have a property interest in the
agency causing the invasion of the use or enjoyment of the land of
another.
A careful search has failed to reveal an American case with a similar
factual situation,"0 and what little English law there is on the subject
is unsettled. The first English case on this point appears to have been
Boulston's Case" in which the court held that defendant was not liable
6. Meyer v. Kemper Ice Co., 180 La. 1037, 158 So. 378 (1934); Ebur v. Alloy
Metal Wire Co., 304 Pa. 177, 155 Atl. 280 (1931); PROSSER, TORTS 398, 410-16(2d ed. 1955). See also RESTATEMENT, TORTS §§ 826-28 (1939), for the general
rules in determining "reasonableness," and specific applications of these rules
in §§ 829-31.
7. RESTATEMENT, TORTS, Scope and Introductory Note to c. 40 at 220-21(1939), where it is stated:
Failure to recognize that private nuisance has reference to the interest
invaded and not to the type of conduct which subjects the actor to liability
has been a fertile cause of confusion. Thus, in respect to an interference
with the use and enjoyment of land, attempts are made to distinguish
between private nuisance and negligence, overlooking the fact that private
nuisance has reference to the interest invaded and negligence to the con-
duct that subjects the actor to liability for the invasion.
-See also 33 MARQ. L. REV. 240 (1950).
8. RESTATIENT, TORTS § 823 (1939).
9. Since the geese in the principal case were migratory wild fowl, neither
the defendant nor the sovereign had a property right in them. Sickman v. United
States, 184 F.2d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1950).
10. Although the factual situation in Sickman v. United States, 184 F.2d
616 (7th Cir. 1950), was very similar, the court held that it did not havejurisdiction to decide the question. The plaintiffs sued for damages to their
crops caused by geese concentrating on a United States game preserve. In
dictum the court stated that one is not liable for the trespasses of animalsferae naturae which have not- been reduced to possession. The language of the
opinion, however, seems to indicate that the court was possibly speaking in
terms of the liability imposed upon a keeper of animals rather than in terms
of liability for nuisance. As to the liability of keepers of animals ferae natura,
-see Manger v. Shipman, 30 Neb. 352, 46 N.W. 527 (1890) (wolf); Stevens v.
Hulse, 263 N.Y. 421, 189 N.E. 478 (1934) (bear) - Olmsted v. Rich, 53 Hun 638,
6 N.Y. Supp. 826 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Gen. T. 18891 (bees); Taylor v. Granger
19 R.I. 410, 37 Atl. 13 (1896) (pigeons). See also PRossER, TORTS 319-26 (2d
ed. 1955), for a discussion of the liability for interferences of one's own animals.
11. Cro. Eliz. 547, 77 Eng. Rep. 216 (1597).
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for damages to his neighbor's farm caused by rabbits which defendant
had introduced on his own land. The cour's holding was based on the
grounds that defendant had no property right in animals ferae na-
turae and that the plaintiff could have protected himself by killing
the rabbits when they came on his land. The reasoning of Bouston's
Case, however, was seriously weakened in Farrer v. Netson.1 In
granting recovery Judge Pollock stated that an action could be
brought by one whose land had been damaged by animals originally
introduced upon the land of another. Moreover, although plaintiff in
this case had no right to kill the animals, it was stated in dictum that
an action would lie even though the animals were ferae naturae and
might lawfully be killed by the person whose land they had invaded.
While expressing no doubt that a landowner could maintain any
amount of game that might reasonably be kept in the ordinary use
of his land, he felt that this right ceased where the use became ex-
traordinary, and unnatural. The right to recovery was said to depend
upon the broad maxim Sic utere tao ut alenum non aedas, i.e., "en-
joy your property in such a manner as not to injure that of another
person.""I Though Bouiston's Case was followed in Brady v. Warrens
and Stear v. Prentce,, the latter cases are distinguishable from the
Farrer case in that the defendant in these cases did not purposely
accumulate the animals. Consequently, the rule in Boutstom's Case,
denying recovery because of a lack of property rights in the animals,
is probably no longer the law in England."
In other areas of the law of nuisance, recovery is allowed for
odors.I noise," or smoke2' which unreasonably interfere with the use
and enjoyment of another's land. In determining the reasonableness
12 [ 188-515 Q.B. 258.BI : 1. at 20.
14, R no, LrGra A.twis 244 (9th ed. 1924). See also Tennessee Coal, Iron
& It Co. v, Hartline, 244 Ala. 116. 11 So. 2d 83 (1943).
15. [19001 2 Ir. I. 632 (action for depredations of rabbits which had been in-
troducel or the land by defendant's zrintor),
16. [1919] 1 K.B. 394 (1918), 18 Mica. L. Rz'. 70 (1919) (rats attracted
by large bone pile on defendant's land). The court distinguished Farrer v.
Nelson (see text supported by note 12 supra) on the ground that plaintiff in
that cas-- had been deprived of his right to kill the pheasants, whereas plaintiff in
this ct e could have used this method of eff-help. This argument, the validity
of which is certainly questionable, see 19 ConLu. L, R. 251 (1919), would not
have feee-hf available in the principal case, since migratory birds are given
sanctuari, under the treaties and laws of the United States which make it un-
lawful to kill such birds except as permitted by regulation. Migratory Bird
Treaty Act, 49 STAT. 1556 (1936), as amended, 16 U.S.C. 703-11 (1952).
See 50 C.F.R. § 6.9 (Supp. 1955) (Permits may be obtained to Ill migratory birds
injurious to agriculture and other interests.),
17. See SAL sOND, ToRTs 671 (11th ed. Heuston 1953).
18, Salt River Valley Water Users' Ass'n v. Arthur, 51 Ariz. 101, 74 P.2d
582 1'37).
19. Kosich v. Poultrymen's Serv. Corp., 127 NJ. Eq. 434, 13 A.2d 825 (Mb.
1940),
20. Marvel Wells, Inc. v. Seelig, 115 S.W.2d 1011 (Ta. Civ. App. 1938).
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of the interference, the courts in such cases look to the maintenance
of the condition which is responsible for the agency causing the injury
rather than to any property right of the defendant in that agency.
Obviously the defendant has no property right in the particles con-
stituting the odor or smoke. Nor do the courts speak of any require-
ment of a property right in the agency causing injury in those cases
where relief is granted against the maintenance of conditions which
allow the accumulation of insects or rodents that interfere with the
use or enjoyment of the land of another.21
It appears that the lower court in the principal case misconceived
the basis of an action for nuisance. By emphasizing the lack of any
property interest in the geese, it ignored the fact that the essence of
the action is an unreasonable invasion of the plaintiff's property in-
terests, and that the court should look to the causation of the inter-
ference only to determine the reasonableness of the invasion.22 It is
true the defendant will not be liable in the great majority of cases
which might arise involving the invasions of animals ferae ncturae.
Probably simply because the animals are ferae naturae, the defend-
ant usually will have done nothing to purposely attract them or to
cause their depredations. However, where one has created conditions
for the very purpose of attracting animals and which cause unreason-
able interferences with the use of his neighbor's land, there would
seem to be no reason to refuse to impose liability. Thus, in the prin-
cipal case, by weighing the utility of the use of defendant's land with
the gravity of the harm caused to the land of the plaintiffs, the court
was merely applying long established principles of the law of nuisance
to a novel factual situation.
21. Yaffe v. Fort Smith, 178 Ark. 406, 10 S.W.2d 886 (1928) (mosquitoes);
Coole v. Haskins, 57 Cal. App. 2d 737, 135 P.2d 176 (1943) (rats). See alsoMaynard v. Carey Const. Co., 302 Mass. 530, 19 N.E.2d 304 (1939) (cockroaches).
22. See text supported by notes 6 & 7 supra.
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